259 316 325 651 During the last thirty or forty years, it is true, the economic situation of the Ukraine has changed considerably; three large industries have developed in the country: the sugar industry, the mining and the metal industries. And one is tempted to say that this development was due to Russian protection. But is this quite correct? Undoubtedly the protection had some influence, but not as much as one might suppose. In the first place, one must not forget that in the Ukraine there are natural conditions much more favorable to these industries than in any other part of the Russian Empire. Certainly the sugar, metal and mining interests are among those which depend on the location of their raw materials and can never start in a place where these are lacking. Besides, these industries are infinitely more fostered by transportational advantages than by custom duties. The duties which were imposed on foreign coal did not prevent the importation of English coal into the Baltic provinces nor into Petrograd. On the other hand, even if all custom duties on foreign coal had been suppressed, it would never have penetrated into central Russia and there replaced the fuel of Donetz. As to the sugar, the situation in the Ukraine was perhaps even more favorable. As to metallurgy, it no doubt profited by the protective Russian tax. But there again the role of this tax was not very great. In fact, the products of Ukrainian metallurgy were heavy (rails, beams, tires, wheels, pipes, iron bars, etc.), and their manufacture was only slightly stimulated by the tax because of the great distances over which they had, in any case, to be carried. Protective tariff is much more necessary to those industries which supply finished products of light weight, but of these the Ukraine furnished very few. The textile industry of Moscow and of Poland profited much more by protection, as did many other branches of the industrial activities of central Russia.

Effect of Russian Imperial Methods in Ukraine

369 241 Therefore, by this system, the Ukraine had more loss than profit. She was still a market for Russian and Polish industrial products, for which she paid high prices. But

for her own industry the Russian custom frontier gave her 369
insufficient protection; on the contrary, it rather reserved 241
the Ukrainian market to Moscow and Warsaw.

Consequently the industrial development of the Ukraine 369
was very slow. The agricultural population did not find 241
enough work in the towns, and, as a result, the surplus of 162
agrarian population increased every year. In some parts of the Ukraine this surplus population was more serious than in any other part of former Russia. In the central Ukrainian provinces the agrarian population reached 800 to 1,000 inhabitants per 1,000 hektares of arable land, while in France and Germany the average was about 500 inhabitants. There was nothing left for the Ukrainian popula- [67]
tion but to emigrate and colonize the lands of Siberia and of Central Asia. There was also a rather considerable movement of emigration towards America. The most fertile governments of the Ukraine furnished many more emigrants than the less fertile but more industrial regions of central Russia.

Emigration as a Possible Solution

As a consolation, it is pointed out that, in case of the 000
reunion of the Ukraine with Russia, the Ukraine will have in Siberia a field for emigration all ready. But that is very poor consolation. Can emigration satisfy any country? Are the Italians proud of sending many emigrants to America? Did the Germans have cause to feel flattered by increasing the trans-Atlantic emigration, before they developed their own industries?

Why, then, should it be the lot of the Ukraine to let her population emigrate to distant Siberia?

Why can she not develop her economic life in such a manner that all her people shall have work on their own soil? The Ukraine ought not to remain an outlet for the industrial work of the Russians and Poles when her own people cannot find any work at home.

But one might ask why no complaint has been heard up to the present, either from the Ukrainians engaged in industry or from those engaged in agriculture? Why did

The proportion of farms managed by individuals decreased to less than 1 % of the entire agricultural area. The men employed at machinery and tractor centers, which seemed to attract all the mechanics required for the colkhose system, formed a privileged class. It depended on them whether an agricultural operation was carried through at the right time. This group was mainly composed of young people and non-Ukrainians. In 1934 some 797 600 were employed on the land and in forests in the Ukraine Soviet Republic. The Soviet officials, not so important numerically as on account of their influence, formed another group of the rural population. Finally, in the country districts there was a fairly large group of teaching and medical staffs and agricultural experts, mostly of Ukrainian peasant origin, as foreigners could not stand life in Ukrainian villages for long. 162 565

Urban population had a large percentage of foreigners, the main social groups being laborers in industry and commerce and the Soviet officials. The number of industrial laborers within the frontiers of the Ukraine Soviet Republic on January 1st, 1936 was 1 308 000. But this figure kept varying constantly, as many of the workers from country districts were not satisfied with conditions of life in the towns and changed jobs frequently or tried to get back home. The Soviet Government fought against these difficulties for years without being able to solve them. This group also included a great number of young people who grew up in post-war conditions. Their nationality varied; about half of the industrial proletariat in Ukraine was of Ukrainian origin. As a rule, material standards were not high. The average wage in 1934 amounted to 166.4 roubles a month, but this figure is not a clear indication of the individual's earning capacity as piece-work was general. In individual cases, where the Stakhanov system (whereby maximum output of labor was achieved) was introduced, higher than average wages were earned. In recent years real wages declined as a result of abolishing the cards which had entitled workmen to certain privileges in buying food and industrial products. Wage earners in Soviet business concerns were similarly situated to those in industrial plants but as the former were less important than the latter in the general scheme of Soviet economy, their develop- 162 369 ● 465 434

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

different: 51 per cent and 49 per cent.' It is necessary to add that Sadovsky includes in production intended 'for general use' in both periods the output of agricultural industry: i.e. sugar, spirits, flour and sunflower oil. If these figures for rural industry are excluded, those for so-called 'light industry' remain practically negligible. For example, only 3 per cent of the textiles manufactured in U.S.S.R. are derived from the Ukraine; and there is no manufacture of cloth or leather goods.

As Sadovsky justly remarks, the policy of exclusively encouraging heavy industry has resulted in the neglect of the economic interests of the western and central Ukraine. In effect, with the policy of industrializing eastern and south-eastern Ukraine, the Soviets have shown a tendency to de-industrialize the wide and rich western provinces. Here the basis of their policy is probably strategic as well as political. 'In a series of towns of right-bank Ukraine such as Zhitomir, Berdichev, Zhmerinka, Mohilev-Podolsk, Uman, Smela, signs of decadence can be observed during the period of the Five Year Plans.'

The 'Economic Plans' of the Soviet Government are subordinated to a general political policy which, as has been explained in the preceding chapter, aims at the complete fusion of the Soviet Ukraine with the rest of U.S.S.R.; and according to Communist theory political unity can only be based on economic fusion. In forcing the pace of the development of heavy industry in the south and south-east to the detriment of the light and agricultural industries of the rest of the country, the Moscow Government pursues two objectives. First, the importance of the Ukrainian national element in the Ukraine is reduced. 'The Ukrainian people are an old people of agricultural civilization and have never shown any inclination for industrial work and life in big towns. The Ukrainian prefers the country if he can earn his living there, and if it is necessary he finds work in the different branches of rural industry' (Brégy and Obolensky). According to official Soviet statistics on the nationality of workers in the Ukraine, the coal industry employs 75 per cent Russians and 25 per cent Ukrainians; the metallurgical, 73 per cent and 22 per cent respectively; the building trades 56 per cent and 37 per cent (*The National Policy of the Russian Communist Party Expressed in Figures*, p. 177). About 50 per cent only of the people in the Donets region are Ukrainians, and among the urban population of the whole of Soviet Ukraine 70 per cent are not Ukrainians. In two big towns like Odessa and Kharkov only 25 per cent of the inhabitants are Ukrainians. The same phenomenon can be observed in centres like Mariupol and Lugansk. In this wise the

4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

It is important to ascertain the number of Ukrainians who remain in the territory of S.S.R. Ukraine. According to Soviet statistics the urban population, amounting to 8,000,000, numbers only 30 per cent of Ukrainians. Among the rural population Ukrainians are in a majority, though they are not everywhere equally distributed: in some regions there are over 80 per cent; in others (like Odessa) 60 per cent; in the Donets rural areas a little over 50 per cent. In 1926, during the period of 'ukrainization' encouraged by the Government, 24,000,000 out of 30,000,000 registered as Ukrainians, but even 15 per cent of these 'native' Ukrainians gave their mother tongue as Russian. Since that date catastrophes have befallen the rural folk of the Ukraine: about 3,000,000 are reckoned to have perished during the famine of the early thirties, and another 2,000,000 certainly have migrated as a result of conditions which they found intolerable. These losses have not been wholly replaced by natural increase, and there is every reason to think that the number of 'native' Ukrainians in the rural population of the Republic has decreased since 1930 by at least 4,000,000. If at that time the number of persons speaking Ukrainian and considering themselves to be Ukrainians amounted to 20,000,000, there can scarcely be more than 16,000,000 peasants left now. If to these are added the number of Ukrainians living in the towns, the total probably amounts to about 18,000,000. In other words, the Ukrainian population of Soviet Ukraine (before the incorporation of Eastern Galicia) amounted to little more than half of the total population.

This figure is eloquent: the Soviet Government has gone a long way to achieve the result towards which its policy was directed, and in the Ukrainian S.S.R. Ukrainians can no longer be considered to be in a great majority. It follows therefore that nearly half the population (16,000,000 to 17,000,000) are not Ukrainians. Among these alien elements a little less than 2,000,000 are Jews; about 1,000,000 are Moldavians; another million belong to different nationalities—White Russians, Poles, Greeks, Germans. The remaining 12,000,000 to 13,000,000 consist either of people born in the Ukraine who do not wish to consider themselves Ukrainians or of 'new-comers' from other parts of the Union. The number of these 'new-comers' must amount to 8,000,000 to 9,000,000.

It is notable that in the last years (since 1930) the Government has used every means to encourage the settlement of these 'new-comers' not only in the industrial areas but also in the purely rural districts. It is obvious that Moscow does not desire vast rural areas with an entirely homogeneous Ukrainian population. The Government prefers groups of *Kolkhozy* on Ukrainian territory to be constituted on the mosaic principle. Each year, from all the Military Districts of the Soviet Union, soldiers who have finished their military service and who have sent in petitions that on account of lack of land they do not wish to return to their original homes are drafted to the new Red Army *Kolkhozy*. These *Kolkhozy*, recruited from the variety of nationalities throughout the Union, are being scattered over some of the best land of the Ukrainian countryside. In some regions there are as many as ten of these military collectivized farms. Reference has already been made to the measures taken by the Government against the bourgeois *kolkhozniki* during the summer of 1939. A new 'movement' of the population is in view in

leaders, like Rakovsky, had little appreciation of Ukrainian life. 517
Few of them understood the language and they preferred to work [645]
through the Russians in the cities and the Donets basin. They were, however, still unable to deal advantageously with the villages where the Ukrainian population was chiefly congregated and they allowed the former Borotbisty to secure key positions in the People's Commissariat for Education. Thus it came about that the one commissariat which could exert the most direct influence on the cultural life of the country was the one in which the Ukrainian influence was strongest.

The time was not propitious for the publication of works of large size and of high artistic value. The years 1919, 1920 and 1921 were years of turmoil when nothing seemed to be real and permanent except death and violence of every kind. The mere struggle for existence was so intense that it absorbed the energy of almost the entire population and the economic decay spread like a creeping paralysis over the land. To the destruction of the civil wars [669]
and of the fighting with Denikin were now added the ravages of the Communist detachments, which swarmed over the country seeking for food to take to the north to save the Russians.

In the early months it would be hardly fair to talk of a Com- 642
munist system of government, for while the theorists were debating [661]
as to how they should build socialism and Communism, armed Communist bands organized under the Red Army or under the Cheka (the Extraordinary Committee for Suppression of the Counter-Revolution) indulged in mass terror, murder and robbery.

The measures adopted in Petrograd and Moscow for the dis- 423
tribution of the land were ill adapted for the Ukrainian situation[1] 369 ●
It was only natural that these were applied with a certain amount of peasant approval at the expense of the larger Russian and Polish landlords, many of whom had cooperated with the Germans. This was the more natural because in pre-war days the bulk of the grain that had been exported from Ukraine had come from these estates and, as everywhere in peasant Europe, the confiscation and division of the land among the peasants reduced the amount of food stuffs available for the urban population.

[1] [of Ukrainian Soviet Republic, 1919 -- Analyst]

Ukraine Under the Soviets

423 The natural result was the growing depopulation of the cities.
369 Peasants who had gone into industry now flowed back to their native villages and demanded their share of the land in the hope that they might be able to raise food for themselves and their families. This increased the already overcrowded rural population and intensified the bitterness that was felt among all classes.

The hatred thus aroused was increased by the formation of committees of poor and landless peasants to take over the estates. Yet in Ukraine there was an important sector of the population who had been the owners and proprietors of from two to nearly one hundred acres of land. In some districts these included nearly a quarter of the peasant families and in an attempt to propitiate them the Soviets were frequently inclined to favor them and allow them to retain their holdings instead of dividing them among the more idle and shiftless of the population.

651 Yet this did not serve to maintain agricultural production[1] for
661 the crying demand of Moscow was for food. The Communists had abolished all markets and taxes but they substituted for them a rule that the peasants were to turn over their entire crop to the government and should retain for themselves only 31 pounds of grain per month for each member of the family. This naturally dissatisfied the peasants who had been won to the support of the new regime by the promises of the government that they could secure for their own use the land of the state and of the landlords. Each year, as the Soviets tried to enforce the collection, they planted less and less acreage and resorted to more skilful methods of hiding what they did produce in the hope that they might somehow exchange it for those manufactured products of which they were in urgent need.

To counterbalance this, the Russian detachments made more and more extensive raids and they were not satisfied to take merely the legal surplus. They seized everything in the way of food and supplies on which they could lay their hands and, in case of opposition, they ruthlessly shot the peasants without any trial or investigation as counter-revolutionists. In a sense they succeeded in their mission, for the food collectors in 1920 secured in Ukraine 2,560,000

[1] [Expropriation of landowners, distribution of land to peasants, 1919-21 - Analyst]

tons of grain or about 75% of the total amount that they secured in the whole of the former Russian Empire. 651 661

This led to new clashes and with the suppression of the larger armed partisan bands, there grew up a new feeling of ugliness that boded ill for the security of the whole regime. The success of the Communists in the industrial centres was thus balanced by their failure to win over any substantial part of the rural population.

In the cities the new regime[1] met with problems of another kind. The workers in the great coal and iron industry where Communism was strongest had at a very early date expelled the managers and foremen and had taken over themselves the operation of the plants, many of which had been ruined in the civil war. Now they found that they were not able to restore production. Industry practically came to a halt and by the end of 1921 there was only one blast furnace operating in Ukraine. The production of pig-iron dropped to 11,300 tons, or barely 3% of the pre-war production. The railroads suffered the same fate. There was no way of repairing them and without a trained administrative staff, they almost stopped functioning. This, in turn, increased unemployment and a lack of food in the cities and once more the city dwellers began to stream out into the country districts. 433 369 [327]

As a final blow there came in 1920 one of those periods of drought which have recurred sporadically in Ukraine throughout the centuries. In view of the general decay in transportation and the ravages of the war, this became serious and the situation grew even worse when the same phenomenon was repeated in 1921. Between the drought and the raiding detachments, the peasants had no reserves of grain and a famine broke out which cost the lives of several million Ukrainians. 731

This famine was very definitely the result of Communist mismanagement, plus the drought, but the Soviet regime was unable to take any effective counter-measures. When its extent was realized, the regime allowed through the League of Nations the organization of the American Relief Administration under Herbert Hoover. This collected and sent to the stricken areas large quantities of grain but it carried on its work with such impartiality that

[1] [Ukrainian Soviet Republic established 1919 -- Analyst]

Ukraine Under the Soviets

185 The peasants also revived and breathed new life into the co-
474 operatives which had been broken up during the period of Militant
241 Communism. In 1923 they established another cooperative organ-
ization, the Selo-Tekhnyka (Village Machines) which purchased
more expensive agricultural machinery and rented it out to the
peasants for the appropriate agricultural work. These points be-
came the centre of mechanization and were in effect the first
[453] tractor stations. In 1924 they established the First Agricultural
Bank, a sort of private institution which at one time had more
loans outstanding than had the Ukrainian State Bank which was,
of course, closely supervised by Moscow.

185 All these efforts met with marked success and agriculture
369 speedily began to revive. The peasants became more prosperous
and their holdings of livestock rapidly increased, although they did
not reach the pre-war level. This, in its turn, created a new demand
for manufactured products and restored the factories to operation,
and with them the conditions in the cities began to improve.

185 Similar concessions were made to industry, but with one im-
471 portant difference. The larger and more important industrial
[475] plants were not turned back to their former owners who were, as
before, allowed no voice or influence in their direction. They were
taken from the workers who had seized and abused them during
the period of Militant Communism and placed under the super-
vision of government trusts. These were either regional in character
or confined to a single branch of industry. In either case, they
were under the control of a more or less trusted group of men
among whom Communists were in the leading positions, but while
they received certain credits from the state, they were more or
less autonomous and they were allowed to go through regular
commercial transactions and encouraged to show profits in their
annual reports. There was thus again a source of encouragement
both for the directors and the workers, and slowly but surely the
level of industry began to rise.

The smaller plants were very often leased to individuals who
were allowed to employ hired labor and the hope was given to
these that their taxes would be at such a level that they, too, could

* [NEP attempts to restore peasant prosperity -- Analyst]

CHAPTER FIVE

Ukrainization

The period of the New Economic Policy was likewise the 186
time when the movement for the Ukrainization of the state reached its highest point. This was a complicated political, cultural and scholarly movement which aimed to develop the Ukrainian self-consciousness in every possible way and to establish the proper role of the Ukrainian language and culture in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. It took many and diverse forms, and while it developed into a definite opposition to Russian influence and Russian methods, it was not primarily so much an anti-Communist as an extra-Communist movement, even though most of its outstanding leaders were tried and tested members of the party.

The basis for the entire movement is to be found in the slight attraction that Communism as a doctrine possessed for the Ukrainian [665]
people. As late as 1927 there were only 122,928 Ukrainian Com- [162]
munists, that is, about thirty-nine for each ten thousand of the Ukrainian population. The bulk of the Communists in Ukraine were Russian and the vast majority of these belonged to the urban proletariat or to the workers in the Donets Basin and Kryvy Rih.

The general period of disintegration during the civil war and [369]
the period of Militant Communism had greatly strengthened the power and self-confidence of the peasants and had weakened the power of the city workmen. This showed Lenin and the dominant group that some method had to be found to win at least the passive support of the countryside if new troubles were to be averted.

The Bolsheviks were well aware of the tenacity with which the 186
Ukrainian peasants, whether they were literate or illiterate, clung 191
to their native language. Lenin had used this characteristic with 665

dred and eighty karbovantsy, they would be required to pay twenty-two and a half karb. in taxes, twenty in rent, fifty as a special tax and they would be required to volunteer to take at least two hundred in government bonds. 241 651 474 465

Even this did not cover the total payments to the government. With its usual love of double-talk and subterfuge, the government, which controlled every branch of human activity in the USSR, talked of the establishment of socialism and levied indirect taxes on all transactions so that the actual cost to the villagers of any manufactured article was about three times what it cost the government as producer. The whole subject was carefully veiled as a state secret to protect the Soviet Union against capitalist intrigues but the unfortunate population were the unwilling contributors to this new order of life.

Under such conditions it is extremely difficult to pierce the veil of percentages as to cost and production and give a reliable estimate as to the amount of money received for the government or the relationship between the sums spent in maintaining the operation of the Moscow-controlled factories in Ukraine and the amount spent upon the needs of the population either individually, as families or as citizens of the UkSSR or of the UkSSR as a governmental unity within the Soviet sphere. From those figures which the Soviet has let out, it is possible to see that the yearly budget of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic has run from 2½-5% of the budget of the USSR while the population has been at least 18% of the total population. [652]

With the villages compelled to yield the last pound of grain, etc., that could be extracted by force, and receiving in return almost no manufactured goods, the position of the city workmen and the intelligentsia was little better. The wages of the workmen were always insufficient, the housing conditions were hardly endurable, and the only point of betterment was that the larger places and some of the plants especially favored by the regime received more manufactured goods of a poor quality and at a high price which the fortunate people might be able to secure. 369 511

369 They could also, if they still had preserved any valuables, dispose
511 of them through the Torgsin stores which sold imported wares for foreign currency and precious metals.

[554] Of course, neither in city or village did any of these restrictions apply to the more important Communists who possessed their own stores at which the government supplied them with the necessary articles to allow them to live in comfort and luxury as a welcome investment for the regime. The line of demarcation between the poor and the rich, the ordinary people and the Communists, became steadily greater, until it was often wider than it had been in the old tsarist Russian empire.

642 All these measures which had been adopted in Moscow were
631 in theory supposed to apply to all sections of the USSR equally, but it was not long before the natives of Ukraine realized that however impartial the laws might seem, they were not sufficiently flexible to take account of local and republican differences. The central regime was interested in advancing and developing the Moscow industrial area and it expended on this in various grandiose efforts, as the Moscow subway, enormous sums of money. It is safe to say that the expenditures in that one area alone equalled the entire budget and money spent by the central government in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. It classified Ukraine as one of the regions where the supply of manufactured goods was less necessary.

The crushing of the Ukrainian Communists, the suicide of Khvylovy and Skrypnyk, no less than the complete altering of the land code of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the substitution of the new policy of collectivization, showed perfectly well where the real power of the USSR lay in the thirties and it was accompanied by such acts as the introduction of Russian as the [701] standard language of instruction and of the army. This was followed by the formal transfer of the Ukrainian divisions to the Red Army and a number of other acts which completed the subordination of the UkSSR. Already in 1930, during difficulties on the Soviet-Manchuria borders, the Red Army had not hesitated to

1 [after 1933 - measures dealing with production, supply etc. - illegible]

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

such as the head of the *oblast* (district) administration, Alexander Iatseniuk, the chief of the city administration, Pavlovs'kyi, and nearly all of his department heads.[50] A wide variety of nationalist organizations sprang up, including Prosvita, churches, and an active theater. Local artists appeared on Ukrainian programs permitted by the German-controlled broadcasting station. Schools, including two *gimnaziias* and a pedagogical institute, were reopened, and a local school administration was established.[51]

The population of the city sank to forty-two thousand (including seven thousand Poles and two thousand Russians) after the deportation of the Jews. However, economic life was stimulated by the reopening of a sugar refinery and other industries; markets were reopened and private trade was encouraged.[52] One hundred and seventy-nine physicians were present, a very high number in proportion to the population.[53] An extremely active youth organization, known, like its counterparts in the West Ukraine, as the Sich, was formed; its activities included sports, choral singing, theatricals, and development of an orchestra.[54]

All of these organizations were under the control of nationalist Ukrainians, although the emphasis appeared to be on the formation of a Ukrainian territorial state which would include all persons, of whatever ethnic origin, living on Ukrainian soil. Thus one of the chief administrative officials, the head of the *raion* administration (i.e., the rural area outside the city) was a Pole, and the director of the economic section of the city administration was a Russian.[55] There appears to have been a large measure of cordiality between the local groups and the OUN representa-

[50] Fedir (Theodore) S. Iefremenko in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 1, 1941, p. 2; 454th Sicherungsdivision, Section VII, Report of October 4, 1941, NOKW 2129 (hereafter referred to as NOKW 2129).

[51] *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist'*, October 1, 1941, p. 1; Iefremenko in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 24 and 26, 1941, pp. 2 and 3; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, August 25, 1942, p. 5; *Nastup*, September 6, 1941, p. 5.

[52] *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist'*, September 15, 1941, p. 1, based on *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* (Zhitomir), August 3, 1941; Iefremenko in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 26, 1941, p. 3.

[53] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 24, 1941, p. 2; many, however, were apparently Jews who were temporarily spared because of their usefulness (*Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 1, 1941, p. 2).

[54] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 26, 1941, p. 3.

[55] *Ibid.*, p. 2, and *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 1, 1941, p. 2.

[Zhitomir in the East Ukraine, 1941 -- Analyst]

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

p. 236

X. NATIONALISM AND THE EAST UKRAINIAN SOCIAL STRUCTURE

●369 The study of the role of Ukrainian nationalist groups in administration and educational life has shown that urban-centered activities played a preponderant role in the development of the nationalist movements in the East Ukraine under German occupation. The more highly developed urban educational systems were primary targets for nationalist organizers, while the cities served as centers from which the nationalists sought to secure popular support by controlling cultural activities and the press. This emphasis on urban activity has a long history in the development of nationalism in both the East and the West Ukraine. Since the rural districts in both areas were strongly Ukrainian in all linguistic and cultural attributes, many felt that it was not immediately necessary to cultivate nationalist sentiment there; they felt these attributes would maintain the national distinctiveness of the villagers. Whether this was a wise view can be more adequately discussed a little later.

During the Second World War, however, this tradition did result in the nationalist groups' devoting a great portion of their limited resources to the East Ukrainian cities, where it was necessary to start almost from the bottom in building national life. An impressive number of accounts by nationalist Ukrainians testify to the predominance of Russian speech and manners in the cities of the East Ukraine throughout the war period.[1] The ex-

[1] In addition to numerous remarks of this nature already cited in relation to particular situations, see *Krakivs'ki Visti*, May 14, 1942, p. 3; November 27, 1942, p. 4; March 2, 1943, p. 2; T. Liakovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, May 17, 1942, p. 3; Iu. Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 12, 1942, p. 3. It may appear surprising that so many convinced adherents of the nationalist movement should have admitted and even stressed the non-Ukrainian cultural character of the cities, since usually

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

planation is, of course, that a vast number of city dwellers were Russified Ukrainians. Naturally enough, the nationalist leaders felt that no secure basis for their program could exist as long as the municipalities of the country were islands of foreign culture.

Within the urban group, nationalist efforts and nationalist sentiment were largely concentrated in one social stratum. Nationalist movements throughout the world have usually been the work of the middle class. Since there had been no East Ukrainian capitalist middle class of any significance before 1920, and since there was no possibility that one could arise under Soviet conditions, except for a few traders carrying on a precarious business under the NEP, a commercial class continued to be lacking. The counterpart to private commercial enterprise which existed under the Soviet regime, the state trading system, was apparently largely operated by Jews and other non-Ukrainian elements.[2] Unfavorable appraisals of the activity of this system, plus distasteful memories of the "profit-and-run" techniques of the nepmen had produced an unattractive image of the private businessman in the minds of most East Ukrainians.[3] Although, under German occupation, a few gestures were made by some city administrations toward encouraging individual enterprise, the chief factors in production and distribution, insofar as the appalling economic conditions made such activities possible at all, were public and

nationalist movements endeavor to claim as large a proportion as possible of the inhabitants of a disputed area as members of their national group in origin and attitude. It must be remembered, however, that the OUN, and some other Ukrainian nationalist groups, were not democratic in ideology; hence the wishes of a majority at a particular time were of little importance in their eyes. Rather, this failure to possess the adherence of the inhabitants of an area which they regarded as theirs through the "rights" of history and blood served as an additional proof of the iniquities of the Soviet regime and of Russians in general and as a stimulus to more strenuous efforts to "correct" the situation.

[2] Some Ukrainians today (Interview 35) state that many wartime ascriptions of all the evils of the Soviet system to the Jews were highly exaggerated, in most cases a forced concession to Nazi racism, but insist that there was a good deal of anti-Semitism in the Ukraine because Jews predominated in retail distribution, and in the conditions of extreme shortage used their positions for selfish purposes. In view of the occupations of most Jews before the Revolution, their numerical predominance in the state distributive system is probably a fact, and it is fairly obvious that any recognizably alien group in such a position would be resented when they could not satisfy the consumers' wants, whether or not peculation played a role in their activities.

[3] Interview 65.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

000 drawn too heavily from particular sources or may too greatly concern special aspects. In the case of urban-rural differences in nationalist activity, it is certain that such a bias exists in the character and extent of the evidence. For one thing, any single activity in a city of some size, such as the development of a Prosvita society, or the control of an administration, is sufficiently important to merit a place in contemporary reports, while a similar rural activity, conducted on a much smaller scale but equally important in its limited area, would probably pass unrecorded. Since the main channels of communication—newspapers and personal contacts of West Ukrainian and émigrés with local figures—were predominantly urban, they would naturally leave behind many more reports on city developments. Perhaps most important is the fact that the higher degree of articulateness of urban dwellers, in the Ukraine as elsewhere, tends to give them a disproportionate share in the written expression which later becomes the historical record.

565 186 369 In the cities, there was no positive goal to compete with the nationalist movements for the hopes and enthusiasms of the populace. The terrible deprivations, the German executions, the *Ostarbeiter* program, the fear of Communist agents, were factors which had a far greater significance for the average urban person than did the efforts of the nationalist movements; but a general effect was to promote passivity and resignation. On the land, however, a positive goal was before all eyes, which for a large segment of the peasantry far outweighed any prospect of national independence, however desirable that might be in itself.[82] This transcendent goal was the destruction of the collectivized system of agriculture and its replacement by a system in which individual initiative and the demands of the peasants would play a greater part. The nature of the agrarian question and the Germans' fumbling efforts to use the peasants' desire to gain support, while retaining the old restrictive kolkhoz system to make exploitation of the peasant easier, has already been described in general terms; it would exceed the scope of this study to treat the subject itself

565 186

[82] This is implied even by nationalist writers; for example, Iurii Tarkovych notes that the first question of peasants in the area between Kiev and Chernigov was, "When will the land be divided?" (*Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 18–19, 1942, p. 3).

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

in greater detail. It is absolutely essential to stress the key nature of this problem, however, for it is almost beyond doubt that any movement which had offered a fully satisfactory solution to the agrarian problem would have won the adherence of the mass of the peasantry, regardless of its stand on the national question.

Superficially, the situation in the countryside was satisfactory from the nationalist standpoint. It is true that certain peasant traits of a distinctively national character had been subjected to erosion by the developments of the Soviet period. The handicrafts, including making of the national costume, had almost vanished under the joint impact of material shortages and growing availability of factory products.[33] The physical appearance of the villages had been altered too and much of their distinctiveness lost through the Soviet destruction of the cemeteries.[34]

In the more basic matter of language, the changes had not been so great, although in some areas at least many "town words" in the "all-Soviet" (i.e., Russian) tongue had been introduced.[35] From the point of view of developing replenishments for the intellectual elite from peasant stock, the situation was worse, however, for the Ukrainian tongue was frequently scorned as the speech of "Ivany i Maryny z kolhospu"—"Johns and Marys off the farm."[36] Even more significant, the mere fact that the peasants spoke Ukrainian, and even had a certain affection for the language as their mother tongue, did not necessarily prove that they possessed any consciousness of nationality. A Ukrainian visitor to one of the villages in the Taganrog district of the lower Don, just beyond the border of the Ukrainian SSR, reported that all the inhabitants spoke pure Ukrainian and retained Ukrainian customs. When addressed as Ukrainians, however, they denied the appellation, insisting that the "Ukrainians" lived over to the west, across the border. The nationalist reporter pointed out the identity of speech and manners with the population to the west, but they replied, "Yes, they are our brothers," yet persisted in denying that they were themselves Ukrainian.[37]

[33] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, June 26, 1942, p. 3.
[34] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, February 15, 1942, p. 4.
[35] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, August 12, 1942, p. 3.
[36] Iurii Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 12, 1942, p. 3.
[37] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 22, 1942, p. 2.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

education of children, and self-control.[42] Generally, however, the clergy was unable to reach many of the Soviet-trained youth; in several villages the latter even objected to returning the church buildings to religious use, preferring that they should be used for Prosvita clubs.[43]

One of the chief agencies by which secular national concepts penetrated the village was indeed the Prosvita organization. How effective it was in general is impossible to say in the absence of more detailed evidence, but in some cases it evidently did at least provide reading material and some cultural contacts of a nationalist character. In this respect the rural teachers were especially important. There is considerable difference of opinion as to their effectiveness as propagators of nationalism, some observers feeling that they did an excellent job under difficult circumstances, others asserting that they lacked national consciousness and were imbued with Communist ideas.[44]

The great difficulty was in finding persons who were sufficiently educated and receptive to nationalist concepts to act as transmitters of propaganda. In the Podolian village referred to above, for example, the physician, who had been a UNR officer, played the chief role in stimulating nationalist feeling. He was greatly assisted in his task by his wife, the village *feldsher* (a sort of trained nurse or secondary category of medical worker); the priest described above; four teachers; and a lawyer. These constituted the "real intelligentsia" as compared with the "half-intelligentsia," consisting of the village elder, the village secretary, two cooperative workers, three kolkhoz directors, three agronomists, four bookkeepers, and three account-keepers, who were described as having "no unified outlook," being still "under the influence of Bolshevik ideology."[45] This criticism of the lower strata of clerical workers in the Soviet intelligentsia, which formed such a key segment of the rural population, is not uncommon in nationalist

[42] *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk*, April 4, 1943, pp. 6–7.
[43] Iurii Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 18–19, 1942, p. 3.
[44] Cf. *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk*, April 4, 1943, pp. 6–7; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 18, 1941, for favorable reports; and Zynovii Matla, *Pivdenna pokhidna hrupa* (The Southern Task Force) (Munich: Tsitsero, 1952), pp. 28–29, for some criticisms of the rural teachers.
[45] *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk*, April 4, 1943, pp. 6–7.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

186 writers.[46] To a certain extent it may be due to resentment against
565 the clerical workers' unresponsiveness to nationalist propaganda,
369 or even to simple snobbery toward those aspiring to the title of
517 "intelligentsia" without a formal education. In part it appears, however, to correspond to a real lack of breadth of mind among this lowest group of the Soviet intelligentsia, a deficiency which would have made it difficult to use them for any political or social movement not tied immediately to their customary frame of thinking.

On the other hand, there were often elements in the villages which were available for some sort of political activity. The memory of Petliura was still present; some refused to believe that he was dead, thinking the story to be Communist propaganda.[47] In another area, both the president of the village soviet and the head of one of the collective farms remained behind and organized life in cooperation with nationalist elements.[48] Yet, in another case, a man of some education in one of the villages, who was related to an émigré minister of the UNR, after expressing fervently nationalist sentiments, recoiled with horror at the idea that his auditor might recommend him to the Germans for an official post, fearing the vengeance of Communist agents.[49] The presence of the latter was, indeed, a great handicap to nationalist organization in the rural areas, where the protection of the police force was not so great (especially in partisan-infested areas) as in the towns, and where the naturally cautious peasant hesitated to commit himself until assured the Soviet administration would never return.[50]

186 Since the organized nationalist forces were so few in members,
369 they could not undertake any direct or continuous indoctrination
208 of the rural population, unless they abandoned their efforts to win the cities. They had to rely primarily on the Prosvita branches, the country schools, and the village administrations. Printed material was also used whenever it could be controlled

[46] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, September 23, 1941, p. 2, reprinting an article from *L'vivs'ki Visti*.
[47] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, June 13, 1942, p. 4.
[48] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 31, 1942, p. 3.
[49] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, June 13, 1942, p. 4.
[50] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 31, 1942, p. 3.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

by nationalist Ukrainians. As a matter of fact, a large proportion of the newspapers in the smaller towns were directed principally at rural readers; the extreme shortage of papers[51] in many areas prevented their being of great influence even when they had some nationalist content. Moreover, the central periodical for farmers, *Ukraïns'kyi Khliborob*, with a weekly printing of seventy thousand, was edited by Eugene Arkypenko, who later joined the Vlasov movement.[52] While this publication was not used against the nationalist cause, it was devoid of positive nationalist material, being confined entirely to technical agricultural articles.

The less-than-lukewarm supporters of the nationalist movements who constituted the bulk of the personnel in positions which provided access to the rural population apparently did not do a great deal to convert the dormant cultural nationality of the peasants into active nationalism. There is no question that the cities inevitably constituted a prime target for nationalist efforts. Probably, in view of the severe limitations imposed by lack of time and nationalist personnel, by Red partisans and German restrictions, the enormous task of overcoming village inertia toward a purely political movement could not have been carried out in any case. Nevertheless, the initial failure of the nationalist groups (at least the OUN and others coming from the west) to grasp the overriding importance of the land question, and the necessity of making this a prime means by which the rural population could be won to the nationalist cause, must certainly be ranked as one of the great lost opportunities of this period. If the nationalists had from the beginning used all their energies to present a positive program of agrarian reform as the heart of their message, they might not have left any tangible organization to withstand renewed Soviet occupation, but they might have left behind a concept of the Ukrainian nationalist movement as a defender of the interests of the peasantry. This, along with the vaguer memories of the Republican era, might have left an enduring imprint on the peasantry.

[51] D. Myronovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 9, 1942, p. 4.
[52] *Volyn'*, June 17, 1942, p. 4; Interview 45.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

culture of the more northern region. The reasons for the smaller farm population are historical rather than purely economic, however. Most of the area was fully settled many generations later than the more northern regions, for it was the principal area of conflict of the Slavic settlers moving down from the north and the Tatar warriors based on the Crimea. The major instrument of colonization was the Cossack fortress settlement or *sich*. In the mid-seventeenth century the Cossacks accepted the suzerainty of the Orthodox tsar, but it was only in the late eighteenth century, after the Russian conquest of the Crimean Tatars, that the steppe was fully opened to peaceful development. These new lands, frequently called "Southern Russia," came to include considerable bodies of non-Ukrainian settlers, mostly Russians, but also large numbers of Germans and Serbs. In 1917 the Provisional Government in Petrograd strongly rejected demands of the Ukrainian Rada for the extension of its authority to the *guberniias* of Kharkov, Ekaterinoslav, Kherson, and Taurida, the last three corresponding roughly to the southern steppe region, since it felt they were not Ukrainian in character.[82]

The northern section of the steppe region, comprising the northern halves of the *Generalbezirke* Nikolaev and Dniepropetrovsk, did contain a preponderantly Ukrainian peasantry. The presence of two very important natural resources—the iron mines of Krivoi Rog and the water power of the Dnieper rapids—had led to rapid industrialization of this area during the period of the Soviet Five Year Plans, with a consequent large increase in the urban population. According to the census of 1939 five of the fifteen Ukrainian cities of over one hundred thousand population lay in this region.[83] At the start of the period of industrialization, in 1926, the city population was very largely non-Ukrainian. For example, Ukrainians formed less than half the total in Kirovograd (then Zinovevsk), Jews being the next largest ethnic group, closely followed by Russians.[84] In Dniepropetrovsk and Zaporozh'e the

[82] John S. Reshetar, *The Ukrainian Revolution, 1917–1920: A Study in Nationalism* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1952), pp. 72–73.

[83] Frank Lorimer, *The Population of the Soviet Union: History and Prospects* (Geneva: League of Nations, 1946), pp. 250–53.

[84] Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Tsentralnoe Statisticheskoe Upravlenie, *Recensement de la Population de l'URSS*, XIII (Moscow, 1929), 13–14.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

proportion of Jews was somewhat lower, but the Ukrainians were even fewer, numbering scarcely more than one third of the population.[85]

The figures for Kirovograd in 1942 are hardly enough upon which to base generalizations.[86] Apparently, however, a great shift to Ukrainian national affiliation, much larger than that which took place in the average northern city, had occurred. As in the case of the other figures, it is not certain that this represents a real change, although it is probable that a large part of the interwar growth was composed of Ukrainian peasants. A number of circumstances suggest, however, that part of the difference arose from a real shift in allegiance of numerous elements of Russian origin, i.e., a shift induced not so much by expectation that persons classing themselves as Ukrainians would have a favored position in a new Ukrainian state, as by a sincere feeling of belonging to a "Ukraine" defined on a geographic rather than an ethnic basis. The readiness of technical specialists, who took the lead in Krivoi Rog, to adopt with enthusiasm Ukrainian symbols, while devoting their major attention to economic reconstruction, suggests that this acceptance of a territorial basis of national identity may have played a role, while the support of Russian cultural and political tendencies by a similar group in Dniepropetrovsk indicates the instability of this choice. Apparently the situation was something like this: as long as the Ukrainian state which the Germans seemed to favor appeared to be an instrument for the overthrow of Communism and the rebuilding of new life, it was readily acceptable; when it became a romantic creed of ethnocentrism it was repugnant as an obstacle to the satisfaction

[85] *Ibid.*

[86] See Appendix. The necessity for caution in interpreting the extremely great shift in Kirovograd is indicated by the fact that the only other large city in the area for which data are available, Dniepropetrovsk, showed a comparatively small shift. It will be recalled, however, that the latter city was under a Russophile administration. Unfortunately, there is no information available concerning the tendencies of the city administration in Kirovograd for the time the census was taken. It is mathematically demonstrable, however, that the decline of the Russian group can be accounted for in Kirovograd only on the basis of a shift of persons formerly classed as Russians to the Ukrainian group, unless one of two rather unlikely assumptions is made, namely that (1) the Russian population actually declined between 1926 and 1941, or (2) numerous Jews later exterminated listed themselves as Russians in 1926.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

an archdiocese of Kherson at an early date.[61] As was related previously, the *Generalkommissar* was suspicious of the Autocephalous Church and urged that steps be taken against it when it grew strong in the north of his area. Later, Michael (Khoroshyi), bishop of Kirovograd, was to come to Nikolaev as archbishop, and was recognized by the *Generalkommissar*,[62] but the pro-Russian ecclesiastical group seems to have maintained a strong position. On the other hand, the extremely large shift in national affiliation in Kherson indicated by the city census suggests that the same factor of adoption of loyalty to the Ukraine as a territorial entity may have been at work here as well as farther north.[63] Farther east along the coast, in the *Generalbezirk* Taurien (Taurida), with its capital in Melitopol' (Melitopil'), there appears to have been little effort at nationalist organization; the newspapers, police, and other agencies were Ukrainian, but seem to have been completely subject to German control.[64]

Beyond the coastal strip just discussed lies the most easterly section of the Ukrainian SSR, the Donbas. This area, in which agriculture takes the form of large-scale wheat farming, as in the far south, is known as the "Ruhr"—or better, one of the "Ruhrs"—of the Soviet Union. Its industry, which grew at a tremendous pace in the interwar period, is based primarily upon rich coal deposits. Its five cities of more than one hundred thousand population in 1939 had nearly tripled their total number of inhabitants since the previous census. It is probable that this increase resulted in a substantial gain for the Ukrainian ethnic component, which previously had been very small, as the surrounding peasantry is largely, though not overwhelmingly, Ukrainian. As far as the technical staffs, which composed the bulk of the educated class, are concerned, however, Ukrainian nationalist observers themselves admit that the great majority was drawn from

[61] *Ukraïns'ka Diisnist'*, January 20, 1942, p. 1. The archbishop was Anthony (Martsenko), who received his appointment in 1941 from the Sobor of Volhynian Bishops. Up to the time of the definite split between the Autonomous and the Autocephalous churches he was apparently still sympathetic to the Ukrainian nationalists as his secretary is reported to have been an OUN member (NO 3279).

[62] *Deutsche Bug-Zeitung*, March 6, 1943, p. 5.

[63] See Appendix.

[64] PS 1695.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1985 RD1 Ukraine RD1

"all over the Union." Consequently, the area could be expected to be very lukewarm in its reaction to the nationalist movements. This tendency was reinforced by the great distance of the region from the stimulation center in the West Ukraine—Stalino is nearly one thousand miles from L'vov—and by the lack of strong historical ties with the Ukraine. Two special factors also played a role: the suppression of the Kiev OUN-M group came before a nationalist revival could get under way in the area, and the news frightened the few nationalist Ukrainians away from public life; and the German army authorities who were in charge were reluctant to permit even the formal and linguistic ascendancy permitted Ukrainians elsewhere.[65] Finally, even according to an OUN organizer active in the area, the Ukrainians were inclined from long habit to allow the Russians priority.[66]

As a result, in a large number of cities in the Donbas, including Slaviansk, Artemovsk (Bakhmut), Debal'tsevo, and Snezhnoe, the Russians succeeded in establishing a cultural ascendancy without, however, its taking on much political significance. This ascendancy included, in particular, the publication of Russian-language newspapers, which as a rule were not allowed in the former Ukrainian Soviet Republic.[67] A number of Ukrainian-language papers were also founded, some expressly designed for the rural population. In Stalino, with the help of OUN-B organizers, a nationalist editor was able to transform an originally Russian paper into a Ukrainian organ, while for a time Ukrainian-language papers with nationalist tendencies were published in Voroshilovgrad and Kramatorskaia (Kramators'ka).[68] In Enakievo an administration of Ukrainians was installed with the aid of Italian troops which occupied the town, while Ukrainian officials were also found in other city administrations.[69] All efforts at nationalist organization were hampered by the fact that the area was not conquered until late 1941, and, except for a brief period in 1942, they lay within a short distance of the front. A few OUN-M organizers were active in the area, and a considerable Bandera net-

[65] PS 051.
[66] Interview 66.
[67] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 23, 1942, p. 3.
[68] Interview 66.
[69] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, March 12, 1942, p. 3.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

work directed by Eugene Stakhiv did what it could to encourage national tendencies among the local Ukrainians.[70]

The city of Mariupol' was an outstanding exception to the conditions prevailing throughout most of the area. While Mariupol' was administratively part of the Donbas, lying in the Stalino *oblast*, it is over fifty miles from the Donets basin itself, on the shore of the Sea of Azov. Like the other cities of the Donbas, however, it had grown enormously, more than tripling in size between the two Soviet censuses. Even after the losses of war, its population numbered 178,358, placing it not far below the largest Ukrainian metropolises.[71] What is remarkable for a city in the Donbas, or indeed in the whole southern area, is that it was under full Ukrainian control. Its well-developed Prosvita society and Ukrainian educational system have already been mentioned. The Orthodox Church is said to have been active and oriented toward Ukrainian nationalism, although here as elsewhere in the far south Protestants and dissident Orthodox sects played an important role.[72] In addition, the mayor was outspokenly nationalist, encouraging the formation of a Ukrainian military force.[73] Probably the guiding spirit in the nationalist development in the city, however, was Nicholas Stasiuk, minister of supply under the Rada in 1918, who had managed to survive the Soviet period by working as a park attendant.[74] He took over the editorship of *Mariiupil's'ka Hazeta* which, although restricted by the paper shortage especially acute in the treeless south, was the second most influential Ukrainian paper on the "Left Bank" (next to *Nova Ukraïna*). While necessarily cautious, its tone was strongly nationalist. Moreover, in addition to Stasiuk, there were a number of nationalist journalists to aid in carrying on the newspaper's work. Stasiuk himself is said not only to have carried on this legal pronationalist activity, but to have assisted the OUN-B underground which made its area base in the city.[75]

[70] Ie. Stakhiv, p. 50; Interview 66.
[71] *L'vivs'ki Visti*, August 27, 1942, p. 2; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 24, 1942, p. 2.
[72] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 3, 1942, p. 2.
[73] Cf. Chapter VII.
[74] Interview 66; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, August 7, 1942, p. 2.
[75] Ie. Stakhiv, pp. 52–54; Interview 66. The nationalist tone of *Mariiupil's'ka Hazeta* is apparent from the considerable number of its articles reprinted in the West Ukrainian and émigré press.

369 The Ukrainian people, being an old nation with an agricultural civilization, is not attracted by industry and by large concentrations of population. It prefers to live in the country, when its material life is assured, seeking to supplement its revenues by semi-agricultural professions such as those of artisan, or small trade, or finally the service of the State.

241 The Ukrainian agriculturalist, especially in the regions of the south, is conscious of participating in the general economy of the country. He takes a great interest in the choice of plants to be developed, in the organization of co-operatives for trade and credit, and in the construction of the means of communication. He is a civilized peasant, a quite European farmer. Without disparaging the intellect and the practical sense of the Great Russian people, it is necessary to recognize that the Ukrainian is more Western in all his conceptions, and more European, than his brother of the north.

163 On the other hand, the Ukrainian people have a great vitality. Among the peoples of Europe they have the greatest rate of increase, which reaches 2·3 per cent per annum. The fecundity of the women is astonishing: between twenty and thirty years it is 23 per cent, while in France it hardly reaches 8 per cent at the same ages.[1]

142 The average height of the men at the period of military service is about 1 m. 69½ cm.

137 342 Ukrainians are very clean and their houses very neat, mostly whitened with whitewash and surrounded by gardens. Fruit trees, particularly cherry trees, give the villages an attractive appearance, especially in the districts of Kiev and Poltava (Zone 1)* where the rich and green nature resembles the landscape of Southern England.

[1] That is to say that for a 100 women between twenty and thirty years one meets 23 expectant ones.

*[see category 116, pp. 139-140. --Analyst]

10: Weinstein S-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

In 1937 only 240 hours were allotted to the study of Russian in the Ukrainian elementary schools,[87] but by 1939–40 the time devoted to this language had increased to 390 hours in the urban type and 429 hours in the rural type of elementary school. The most important change, however, occurred in the middle schools, the form of general school gradually replacing the elementary schools. In the middle schools, as the table indicates, a larger proportion of hours for language study are assigned to Russian than in the elementary schools. The table also reveals that the study of Russian in the Ukrainian middle schools is given more time than the study of Ukrainian in the Russian middle schools. As for the schools of the smaller minorities, illustrated by the plan for the Jewish and Moldavian schools, Russian assumes greater importance than Ukrainian; and in the middle schools of these nationalities, the study of Ukrainian has a position far below Russian and only a little higher than that of foreign languages. The pupils of the smaller nationalities would encounter Ukrainian in their extra-school life more frequently than Russian, except in the large cities where Russian is still widely used in social intercourse; and if they were to know Ukrainian and Russian equally well, more time would have to be assigned to the latter. Likewise, the Russian pupils, except in the large cities, would be more familiar with Ukrainian than the Ukrainian pupils with Russian. Because the village children would hear Russian spoken less often than the city children the rural schools have more time allotted to Russian than do the urban schools. The study of foreign languages has become increasingly important since 1932; and only last November the Commissariat of Education decided that in some middle schools the study of French, English or German should begin in the third rather than the fifth grade, thereby raising the time devoted to foreign languages from 446 hours to 602 hours.[88]

Educational work among the older generation follows the direction of that among the children in the schools. A campaign to teach adults to read and write their mother tongues has met with substantial results, and the newly literate non-Russians are being encouraged to go on and study Russian as well as their native languages. This fostering of bi-lingualism is accompanied by an attempt on the part of the government to make the population in the Ukraine multi-cultured. Increased attention is being given to popularizing the literature and music of the Russians and of other nationalities both within and without the Soviet Union; and the Russian cinema and radio are —

[87] *Za Kommunističeskoe Prosvěščenie*, May 14, 1937.
[88] *Zbirnik Nakaziv . . .* , 1940, sec. 336, pp. 8–9.

10: Weinstein S-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1

in spite of efforts to produce films and to broadcast programs in the Ukrainian language — potent forces for assimilation to Russian culture. To the goal of assimilation, moreover, much is contributed by the industrialization of the Ukraine: new factories bring rural Ukrainians into the cities where Russian still predominates in social life, and the younger Ukrainians in the city easily adopt the prevailing language. But these forces for assimilation, even though coupled with the inculcation of communist doctrines through the media of education and culture, may be cancelled by a growth of nationalism; and such nationalism may thrive on the shocks of economic disorders and unsuccessful foreign war. The language policy itself promotes the process of assimilation by encouraging bi-lingualism; but by stressing the use of minority languages, it furthers at least a greater temporary diversification. The question of whether the forces of unity are now stronger or weaker than the forces of division can be answered only by the future.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

476 was made in the cooperative society's own factories. The society owned cement factories, lime plants, mills, cloth-weaving factories, bakeries, oil presses and even a factory that made boot polish and cosmetics.

439 Whither did Ukrainian goods go? Peas, beans and poultry to England and Belgium, clover seed to Holland, /94/ pigs to Germany, beef cattle via Constanta to Greece, poultry to Germany, Switzerland and to - Palestine, eggs to many countries and, in cans, as far as Buenos Aires.

[545] Sociologically noteworthy is the growth of an urban stratum of artisans, merchants and small industrialists. The Ukrainians who, much to their •369 own disadvantage, neglected the cities because of 476 their love for quiet village life, now gradually pushed into the cities, and the credit cooperatives supported them in this.

*

741 Of greatest significance for the advancement of Ukrainian culture were the societies for edu- 517 cation and public health. The society for popular 217 education, "Prosvita", was even older than the Ukrainian system of cooperatives, reaching back to 1883. It was a veritable national sanctuary of the Ukrainians. The people are indebted to it for a large part of their cultural advance. The "Prosvita" was an actual school for advanced studies in the country. In 3214 village libraries with 700,000 volumes, two instructive monthly magazines and with inexpensive editions of books, it enabled the village inhabitants who were cut off from all urban culture to obtain the knowledge which alone made it possible for them to assert themselves against their enemies. Besides that, 741 "Prosvita", which on January 1, 1938 numbered 517 360,000 members, and owned 1457 club houses with rooms for meetings, promoted group singing, music, the community theater and folk art. It helped

665 Ukrainian population prefers to read, whereas the works of Russian authors remain completely unknown in the Ukraine. It goes on to say that this is a very detrimental phenomenon, for Russian culture is important for the entire Soviet Union and for the whole world, while Ukrainian culture is of merely local significance.

Conversely, the Ukrainians accused the Muscovites of chauvinism. Stalin, the Georgian, tried to pronounce a Solomonic judgment at the Sixteenth Party Congress in June 1930 by condemning both Great Russian and Ukrainian nationalism: "Great Russian chauvinism under the communists reflects the efforts of the ruling classes of former Russia to reconstruct their lost privileges of domination over other peoples. As a result, the chauvinism of Great Russia is the chief danger in the national policy of the Communist Party." In accordance with these ideas, the Sixteenth Congress adopted the resolution that the Party should /117/ intensify its fight against Great Russian deviation and the deviations of "local nationalism".

648 As a matter of fact, Ukrainian nationalism 7
182 was indeed becoming a danger to Bolshevik Moscow. As compared to the period of war-communism, the Ukraine was living in remarkably comfortable circumstances. The fact that the majority of the Ukrainian people, the rural population, enjoyed an adequate subsistence, must have had a positively irritating effect on the urban masses in their wretched circumstances. 7 Was not this an open refutation of the communist doctrine? There was the additional fact that the Ukrainians became more and more importunate with their varied demands, and that the power of the Ukrainian government had increased so much during the NEP period, that finally it headed the opposition of non-Russian peoples in the Council of Nationalities (the second chamber next to the Supreme Council) and forced Moscow several times to change its

•[369]

7 [During the NEP period in the Soviet Union - Analyst]

361 the shadows of cherry and mahaleb trees. There every poor farmer adorns his dwelling with lovely, ever-smiling nature..."

Where there is no local building commission, where the street finds its own way, where the four corner posts of a house are set in humus; where no cellar is dug, there/134/the houses and villages grow out of the ground willfully like mushrooms. These are the cluster villages. The villages built in rows with streets are found in the newly settled regions of the Ukrainian steppes and the Kuban. In this new country the Ukrainians, [369] who otherwise love villages, also live on isolated farms. In the north and along the rivers they build wooden houses, and in the steppes, houses of loam. Even in the cities stone houses are rare. Flowers, hollyhocks and sunflowers are to be found in front of every cottage. As a rule, the Ukrain- 342 ian farmhouse has two to three rooms. Whether it houses a poor family or a rich one, the ground plan is always the same; only the size varies. There is the vestibule with the summer kitchen and one half of the stove that extends through the wall; the other half stands in the large livingroom where cooking takes place in the winter, where the family lives, where they receive guests and where everyone sleeps. Then there is also a small storage chamber. The furnishings of the large room are simple and clean: there is a bench running all the way around the large, decorated clay stove and around the room; a rough table and a few chairs stand in the corner, also a sleeping platform for the parents, and a chest. Many icons, "the gods", decorate the wall. Since the barns are very primitive and draughty, a new-born calf or a young lamb that needs warmth is sometimes brought into the room when the winters are cold.

*

000 Seventeen ingredients are supposed to go into

433 became /165/ "Red Progress, Dnepropetrovsk", and so on. The giant tractor factory in Khar'kov was newly erected, an accomplishment which is proudly shown to every foreign visitors. Important, however, is not only the number of tractors that leave the factory, but also their serviceability and durability. The significance of the industrial plants which have remained from the pre-war period is also evident from the invested capital, according to which, just as before, the iron industry ranks first, coal second and the sugar industry third. In these three industries half of the entire capital invested in Ukrainian industry is combined. Only after that come machine construction and the chemical works which to a certain extent have arisen only in most recent times. (106)

106. Kubiyovich: Commentary to the Atlas, page XXXIII.

259 The sugar industry forms only a part of the food and luxury industry which was a very important branch even before the war. Its center is in the beet-growing region between Podolia, Kiyev and Khar'kov. In 1913 200 Ukrainian sugar factories produced 1.2 million tons of sugar, in 1933 170 factories produced 0.8 million tons. (107)

107. Deminskiy, The Economy of the Ukraine, page 140.

258 Besides that there is, also dating back to the pre-
274 war period, a considerable mill and oil industry, the latter in the Kuban region, as well as distilleries.

*

369 The increase of urban population is a natural concomitant of industrialization. The Ukraine has

369 always belonged to the countries of the world that have the least number of cities. In 1897 only 3% of the population of the entire Ukraine lived in large cities, and as late as 1926, only 6.7%. In 1931 Greater Ukraine had 12 cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants. In the almost thirty years between 1897 and 1926 the village population increased by 41.5% and the urban population, also as a result of immigration, of course, by
162 85.4%. (108) The natural increase of the Ukrain-

108. Kubiyovich: Distribution of the Population in the Ukraine, page 30.

ian population belongs to the largest of Europe, in fact is often the largest. True, mortality is high - about 20 deaths annually per 1000 inhabitants -, but /166/ the birth rate is still essentially higher - about 40 births annually per 1000 inhabitants. The lowest population surplus is shown in densely populated Galicia with 11.5 per thousand, and Carpatho-Ukraine with 16.1 per thousand. In 1927 the natural increase in Soviet Ukraine amounted to 22.5 per thousand and in the Crimea to 26.8 per thousand. (109)

109. Kubiyovich: Distribution of the Population in the Ukraine, page 26.

369 The new period of growth of the Ukrainian cities, however, is limited to the Central Ukrainian industrial areas and the Donets Basin. The West Ukrainian cities are unsuitable for industrialization on account of the proximity of the border and the lack of larger power sources. Besides, traffic communications are extremely inadequate. These cities even decreased in population, just like the seaports, where today commerce and export
369 support fewer people than before the First World
162 War. During the first Five Year Plan the urban

369 population in the right-bank section of Soviet
162 Ukraine decreased by 4.2%, whereas in the left-bank section it increased by 44%, in the Donets region alone by 93.5%. (110) Kiyev which was

110. Kubiyovich: Distribution of the Population in the Ukraine, page 32.

the quiet city of scholars and monasteries before the First World War shows 846,000 inhabitants according to the census of 1939; Khar'kov, the industrial and barracks city with its over-sized ostentatious buildings and skyscrapers shows 833,000; Odessa, where before the First World War 620,000 people lived and in 1923 324,000, houses 604,000 people in 1939. This seaport which was built by Catherine II suffered most in the famine of 1920.

According to the census of January 17, 1939 the entire population of Soviet Ukraine amounted to 30,960,221 souls, of whom about 19,764,000 lived in villages and about 11,195,000 in towns. In the census of 1926 the proportion of the urban population was 16.5%, whereas in 1939 it was said to be about 36%. According to these figures, Soviet Ukraine has, in the space of 13 years, changed from an agricultural country to a decidedly industrial country. Such a revolutionary process taking place within such a brief period, should be considered as out of the question, for similar developments in /167/ the central and western European countries took many decades under more favorable conditions. In order to be convinced of this analogy between Soviet Ukrainian urban development with that of Central Europe, one would have to be more familiar with the basic principles of Muscovite statisticians. For example, one might find an explanation for such an inorganic growth of the urban population in the fact that all settlements of over 2000 inhabitants

369 were counted as towns, whereas in former times
162 even the huge peasant villages of 30,000 and 40,000 inhabitants were placed in the category of villages.

The result of the new census becomes particularly interesting if one brings in for comparison the Statistique de la population de l'Oukraine contemporaine published in 1929 by the statistical office of the Soviet Ukraine in Khar'kov in both Ukrainian and French. In this publication the population figure on January 1, 1929 is given as 30,363,547. According to that, the population of Soviet Ukraine increased from January 1, 1929 to January 17, 1939 by only 596,674 souls. From the beginning of the Five Year Plan period, however, the normal annual increase amounted to 600,000 souls, according to the birth surplus of 20 per thousand; this would be 6 millions in 10 years. Thus the population decreased by about 5.4 million souls from 1929 to 1939. In an evaluation of these results we must keep in mind the fact that since 1936 abortions have been punishable by 10 years imprisonment, and that a large immigration of Russian and Far Eastern elements has taken place, which was particularly promoted by Moscow.

162 No less serious than these factors is the
167 decrease of village population since 1926 by 4.41 million souls. Even if the largest part of these 4.41 million village inhabitants should be counted city dwellers, the decrease thus being only apparent, what has happened to the increase of the peasant population? The census of 1939 reveals the silent tragedy of the "dead frontier", the strip of land about 50 kilometers wide /168/ at the former Rumanian and Polish boundary, which had to be cleared of Ukrainian inhabitants. It betrays the famine from 1931 to 1933, the exiles
167 to the frosty North and the dislodgments. On this point the Komsomolets Ukrayiny of May 21 and 22, 1939 wrote that the Ukrainians were being

161 sent as farmers to the Far East and to Kazakstan, and as laborers to the construction of the railway lines Donets Basin-Moscow and Akmolinsk-Kartaly. The railway Akmolinsk-Kartaly crossed the desert of Kazakstan in an 806 kilometer stretch. The Visti of June 3, 1939 complete this picture when they write: "The Soviet Ukraine annually furnishes the newly-arisen industrial centers in the other Soviet Republics with hundreds of thousands of laborers. At Magnitogorsk, Kutsbas, in the Far East and on the Turkish Railway there are thousands of construction workers who come from all different parts of the Ukraine."

• 389 This policy of splitting up the Ukrainian people must in the long run have all the more fateful consequences since the cities in the Ukraine are primarily in foreign hands. "The Ukrainian people remained peasants and villagers; they left their cities in the hands of foreigners, Russians, Jews, Germans, Poles." This was the complaint even before the First World War of the Ukrainian geographer Rudnitskyj: (111) The Ukrain-

111. Rudnitskyj: ibid., page 162.

ian peasant son did not want to go to the city where people spoke in foreign tongues. Village tranquility and quiet romanticism he recaptured only in the country. And thus the Ukrainian peasant youth wandered by the hundreds of thousands to the Kuban, the Volga, to Siberia and yonder to the shores of the Pacific Ocean in order to colonize new land there, while foreigners took possession of the Ukrainian cities. The result was 162 369 that from 1926 to 1931 in the cities of all Ukrainian provinces there were 38.8 Ukrainians per 100 inhabitants, 28.1 Russians, 21.6 Jews, 6.9 Poles, 0.8 Germans and 3.8 of other nationalities. (112)

112. Kubiyovich: Georgraphy of the Ukrainian and Bordering Areas, page 307 and 308.

11: Obermaier--181 J-3(no date)1942 RD1UkraineRD1

In 1926 there were 42.1% Ukrainians in Kiyev, 38.3% in Khar'kov, 17.4% in Odessa, /Facing page 168/ /Map XII: Balance of Trade in the Soviet Ukraine. The diagrams on this page permit a comparison of import and export during the periods before and after the First World War. Note the decrease of exports in agricultural products and the increase of industrial exports/ /Captions:/

369•
162
439

Diagram of
Foreign Trade of the Soviet Union in
1909/11, 1913 and 1934
(in million rubles)

1.
Export, of this trade with Russia
/In circle marked 795:/
Grain 222
Metal and metal goods 90
Products of animal husbandry 56
Other produces 28
Other agricultural products 399

2.
Import
/In circle marked 472:/
Metals and machines 34.5
Naphtha products 33.5
Groceries 33
Leather & leather goods 31
Fish 29
Wood products 17
Other products 17
Other finished products 217

3. Export
/In circle marked 744:/
Grain 235
Metals & crude metals 116
Products of animal husbandry 53
Coal 50
Other products 25
Sugar 265

4. Import
/In circle marked 331:/
Wood products 37
Naphtha products 13
Metal goods
Other products 74
Other finished goods 197

5. Export
/In circle marked 720:/
Sugar 160
Coal 140
Grain 50
Ores 10
Metals and machines 360

11: Obermaier--182 J-3(no date)1942 RD1UkraineRD1

439 6. Import
/In circle marked 380:/
Naphtha 110
Wood products 70
Fish 20
Products of animal husbandry 5
Other finished products 180

7. Export of various goods from the Soviet Ukraine in 1913, 1928, 1932 and 1934 (in million tons).

8. Coal

9. Ores

10. Iron & steel

11. Grain

12. Sugar

13. Wood

14. Naphtha & naphtha products

15. Various finished products

000/Also facing page 168/ /Where tractors are worn out harrowing is now done with horses/ /Facing page 169/A/At planting time the seed must be got into the ground within a few days. The tractor is particularly adapted to the cultivation of large 369 areas/A/169/ 35.9% in Dnepropetrovsk, 16.2% in 162 Lwow (1931), 28.9% in Stalin, 29.9% in Krasnodar (chief city of the Kuban region), and 17.8% in Chernovtsy.

*

563 The Jews immediately seized what the Ukrainians had passed by. During the wars with the Turks Catherine II had opened to them the south Ukrainian gubernıyas of Taurien, Kherson and Katerinoslav, the present-day Dnepropetrovsk. In 1835 the right of settlement of the Jews was extended to the entire right-bank section of the Ukraine with the exception of the city of Kiyev. The rest of Russia was almost completely free of Jews until 1917. From that time on all of Russia was open to them, and immediately the emigration

1/A [For plates, cf. pp. 224-225, category IIc-Analyst]

731 262 [443] 265 Most of the UNRRA food supplies delivered to the Ukraine are distributed to ration stores for sale to workers and their dependants. A large proportion (about 35 per cent.) also goes for communal feeding through dining rooms, health resorts, homes for invalids and the aged, and dining halls of trade schools. Hospitals, childrens' homes, maternity homes, and the like also receive a share (around 10 per cent.) (The food distributed to welfare organizations is delivered free of charge).

731 262 434 Apart from the food which UNRRA supplies, the Ukrainian people are dependent on whatever amounts of local produce may appear on various markets. According to the rationing system, the farmers are allowed to retain part of their produce to feed themselves and their dependants, and the farm's livestock; the state then purchases a certain quota for use in feeding the non-farm population. If any surplus then remains, the farmers may keep it, or sell it on the free market at uncontrolled prices.

241 433 434 In practice, however, because of the extremely poor harvests in the last two years, Ukrainian farmers have scarcely been able to feed even themselves; and the amounts of domestically produced food which reach the ration stores or the free market have consequently been small.

The following section describes the sources of food supply open to the urban consumers.

The System of Food Distribution

443 434 In the cities of the Ukraine there are three outlets through which foodstuffs reach the population:

● 364 262 (a) the ration stores, where the bulk of foodstuffs are sold at fixed prices to ration-coupon holders;

(b) the so-called gastronoms (commercial stores) where scarce, luxury items are sold; and

(c) the public markets, where collective farmers and peasants bring their surplus produce for sale.

Most of the rural areas and villages of the Ukraine are expected to produce locally enough food to feed the inhabitants; and as they are nearly all considered to be self-supplying, they receive through the central distribution system only sugar and sometimes bread. Their surplus farm produce (that is, food in excess of that needed for feeding people or livestock on the farm and not subject to collection or purchase by the state) is usually brought by the farmers to the public markets for sale to the urban population. [435] The quantities of produce and the variety of items available in the free public markets vary greatly from season to season and from day to day; prices are equally variable.

262 Expectant and nursing mothers are usually at work, and have standard
745 leaves with pay and special privileges; thus, if working, they receive
434 rations appropriate to the occupational group, plus special food allowances; and if not working, dependents' rations plus these allowances. The supplements are as follows, monthly: cereals, 1.2 kilograms; butter (or substitute), 0.8 kilograms; sugar 0.6 kilograms; vegetables, 2.0 kilograms; milk (fresh or dried) 12 litres. Their approximate calories from rations alone are, therefore:

If light workers	1,682 plus 512 -	2,194	calories daily
If employees	1,144 plus 512 -	1,656	" "
If dependents	704 plus 512 -	1,216	" "

In the last case it is almost possible to assume that the husband is well paid and will be able to buy products in the open market.

262 Even if the established ration scales for all groups could be met, they would not provide an adequate, balanced diet. Particularly the rations for women and children are very light in fat, first-class protein, and calcium. They provide less than half the low League of Nation's standard for daily full-cream milk requirements of the expectant mother. But even these inadequate scales are seldom supplied.

262 Since mid-October 1946, the honouring of ration cards has, because
434 of the increasing food shortages, become more and more irregular. In December 1946, for instance, large groups of persons in the Kiev area received only bread, sugar, and a few tins of vegetables on their cards. No meat, fish or fats were available. By the middle of January 1947, the situation had grown even more stringent, and only bread was supplied on the ration.

At the same time, the amount of food available off the ration has decreased almost to the vanishing point. Cereals and white bread have practically disappeared from the open market; and when they are available, the price is beyond the reach of the average person.

262 The effects of the poor diet are already to be seen. The people
181 generally show a noticeable lack of their former liveliness, energy and
164 cheerfulness. Moreover, according to the Medical Officer of the
●369 UNRRA Mission to the Ukraine, clinical starvation has made its appearance in the smaller villages of the Republic: protein dropsy and avitaminosis are increasing; and among the townspeople there is great incidence of skin infections and respiratory and nasopharyngeal conditions.

645 In order to meet some of the medical aspects which may arise out of
744 the present food situation, the Ministry of Health has taken the follow-
262 ing steps.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Mountainous Ruthenia is a country of traditional costumes. The beautiful embroideries which decorate them and their colour-effects testify to the innate artistic sense of the people. Their patterns and hues vary not only from tribe to tribe but also from village to village. Blue, brown and red are their favourite colours, but one may say that practically all the colours are represented. On weekdays their attire is rather simple. But on Sundays and festivals the space in front of the wooden church is a veritable kaleidoscope of well-blended hues. Particularly striking is the garb of the Huculs whose artistic talent also shows in their elaborate wood-carvings and in their love of music.

Life is hard in the mountains and forests of Carpathian Ruthenia. Yet the small farmers, wood-cutters, labourers and shepherds who live there are a friendly and hospitable race. The traditional rule that a stranger who comes into a Ruthenian cottage is to be hospitably received has found a remarkable illustration in recent times. The inhabitants of one village in the South have decided that the passengers on the bus which passes through the village once a day have to be treated as guests. And so whenever the bus arrives a peasant woman with a basket full of fruit or cheese or buns is waiting at the stop to share out her eatables among the travellers.

In the southern part of the country life and people are different. Here one comes across fields of maize, wheat and tobacco, while on the sunny hills bordering on the fertile plain further south there are rich vineyards. But most of this good soil is not the property of the Ruthenians; they have been pushed into the mountains by the Hungarians who owe much of the land and employ the native Ruthenians as seasonal labourers. In this part of the country the population is mixed, and the Ruthenians who live here have surrendered much of their racial individuality as well as the traditional costumes. No wonder that those uplanders who moved south for economic reasons long to return to their poor but proud mountains.

Carpathian Ruthenia is a rural country. Even its largest towns, such as Mukačevo with a State tobacco factory and other works, Berehovo, the centre of the Ruthenian wine trade, Sevljuš with excellent vineyards, are essentially provincial in character.

The largest town, Užhorod, has assumed the character of a modern city since it became the capital of Carpathian Ruthenia during the twenty years of the Czechoslovak Republic. The government built here imposing public buildings as well as large blocks of up-to-date residential flats for its civil servants. Prominent among these representative buildings is Zemský Úrad housing the headquarters of the administration of Carpathian Ruthenia; its façade is strictly modern and its interior, particularly the Parliament Chamber and the large Reception Hall, is beautifully equipped.

This part of Užhorod is well laid out; right along the river bank

21: Kolarz J-4 (no date) 1952 R1 Soviet Union R1
UKRaine RD1

THE UKRAINE

UK. 162 369

According to the 1926 census there were but 8 per cent Great Russians in the Ukraine, but these were mostly town-dwellers and proletarian elements and thus were able to play a considerable part in the political history of the Ukrainian S.S.R. since, according to Bolshevik principles, city workers necessarily lead the peasants, and the towns the countryside.

The towns of the Ukraine during the inter-war period had been not only bi-national Russian-Ukrainian but tri-national Russian-Ukrainian-Jewish, with the Jews frequently gravitating culturally to the Russian side. In Kiev, the largest Ukrainian city, the Ukrainians were originally the smallest ethnical group of the three. The 1926 census showed that Kiev's population consisted of 25·4 per cent Ukrainians, 36·2 per cent Russians, 32·1 per cent Jews and 3 per cent Poles. After 1926 the balance improved in favour of the Ukrainians but basically Kiev remained a Ukrainian-Russian-Jewish city. Kharkov, almost equal in size to Kiev, had in 1933 48 per cent Ukrainian inhabitants, whilst there were 30·3 per cent Russians and 17·7 per cent Jews. Of all the big cities of the Ukraine, Odessa, the capital of 'New Russia' has always been the least Ukrainian. Even including Odessa's country district the Ukrainians accounted for only 41 per cent of the total population against 23 per cent Russians and 20 per cent Jews. In the city of Odessa there were 17·5 per cent Ukrainians against 38·6 per cent Russians and 36·4 per cent Jews. Dniepropetrovsk, the fourth largest city of the Ukraine, in 1933 comprised 36 per cent Ukrainians, 31·5 per cent Russians and 26·6 per cent Jews.

The drastic reduction in the number of Jews through Hitlerite massacres and evacuation during the war improved the position of the Ukrainians in the cities of the Western and Central Ukraine, but in the industrial regions of the Eastern Ukraine the Ukrainians cannot keep pace with the tempo of urbanization and the needs of manpower. The two eastern border provinces of the Ukraine, Voroshilovgrad and Stalino, making up the Donets Basin, are inhabited by an international working-class, in particular by a strong Russian element, and are steadily growing in importance in relation to the Ukraine as a whole. The population of the Stalino Province rose by 91 per cent between 1926 and 1939 and that of the Voroshilovgrad Province by 37 per cent during the same period. The growth of the Stalino Province can be even better assessed by comparing the numbers of inhabitants of its three largest towns in 1926 and 1939. Stalino, the provincial centre rose from 174,000 to 462,000, Makeyevka from 79,421 to 240,000, Mariupol from 64,000 to 222,000.

STALINIST CENTRALISM VERSUS UKRAINIAN AUTONOMY

S.U. 631 186
UK. 186 642

The fact that Russians and Ukrainians are from the historical, geographical and ethnical point of view objectively inseparable calls for a certain

31: Sosnovy S-5 (no date) 1954 R1 Soviet Union R1
UKRAINE RD1

S.U.
342
362*
423

obtain but may also be of inferior quality. The individual builder has also been faced with the problem of the government's attitude toward him which has been marked, as we have seen, by considerable fluctuations.

At the end of the twenties, Gosplan severely criticized individual building:

> The individual builder takes no account of sanitary or technical requirements, builds his house using very cheap and often defective materials and neglects to equip his dwelling with facilities considered an essential part of urban housing. The result is inferior but very inexpensive houses,[125] usually situated, without any planning, on the outskirts of the city; this is a tremendous obstacle to the future development of city planning.[126]

Some writers have noted that individual dwellings "consist of a one-room apartment with a kitchen, which serves at the same time as dwelling space" and "that these houses, in essence, differ very little from the village *izba*...."[127]

---

125. Average cost per sq. m. of dwelling space in the individual sector was one-quarter of that in the public sector. See *Kontrol'nye tsifry narodnovo khozyaistva SSSR na 1927/28 g.g.* [Control Figures for the National Economy of the U.S.S.R. for 1927-1928], Moscow, 1928, p. 201.

126. *Pyatiletnii plan narodno-khozyaistvennovo stroitel'stva SSSR, op. cit.*, Vol. II, Part 2, p. 283.

U.
269 ●
342

127. *Planovoye khozyaistvo*, Moscow, No. 9, 1927, p. 150. The following data (average figures) illustrate prerevolutionary rural living standards in the Ukraine, which were superior to those in other republics: 1.5 rooms per dwelling; 4.7 sq. m. of dwelling space per person; 75.7% of all houses had blind windows; only 5.2% had hinged window panes; 37.3% had a light coefficient of 1:15 (ratio of window space to floor space; in an average size room, the ratio is 1:8) while in the remainder it was considerably lower; 55.1% were damp; 94.8% had earth floors; and 81.4% had straw-covered roofs. Water and sewage systems, electricity, and gas were nonexistent in the rural areas. Rural housing in the postrevolutionary era eliminated many of these shortcomings. See Marzeyev, *op. cit.*, p. 426.